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Commonwealth v. Matos: A Decision
Without Direction
I. INTRODUCTION
Suppose that in the middle of the day, you and your police
partner are patrolling the streets of a Philadelphia neighborhood
in your cruiser. A police radio broadcast indicates that unknown
persons are selling narcotics in the vicinity of 2300 Reese Street.
Since you are close to that location, you and your partner proceed
to investigate. Upon approaching the location, you notice three
men standing on the corner. These men look in your direction
and immediately take flight. You and your partner have done
nothing more than drive towards them on a public street. What
do you do? Common sense and police training dictate that you
follow the men and at least attempt to ascertain why they fled at
the mere sight of your police car.
On April 8, 1991, this exact set of circumstances occurred in
the case Commonwealth v. Matos.1 The police officers in Matos
decided to pursue the fleeing men.2 During the chase, one of the
officers saw a man discard a plastic baggy.3 The officer recovered
the bag, which contained what was later identified as twelve
vials of crack cocaine. 4 Another officer arrested the man who dis-
carded the cocaine.5 During his trial on drug charges, the
defendant successfully argued to suppress the twelve vials of
crack cocaine as being the product of an illegal seizure.6 The
Pennsylvania Superior Court later reversed this suppression
decision.' In 1996, on appeal, the Supreme Court of Penn-
sylvania held that the trial court properly suppressed the crack
cocaine evidence discarded by the defendant.8 The court rea-
soned that the incriminating evidence was properly suppressed
because the defendant discarded it as a direct result of an illegal
1. 672 A.2d 769 (Pa. 1996).









seizure perpetrated by the police officers who gave chase without
reasonable suspicion.9
In an effort to protect the privacy rights of Pennsylvania citi-
zens, the supreme court in Matos went beyond the privacy rights
guaranteed under the United States Constitution without a con-
vincing justification. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court has
decided to retain the view that a seizure occurs when an individ-
ual is being pursued by police officers and no longer feels free to
leave.10 Although such a decision is permissible,1 the court's
overly broad definition of seizure in this case has led to an unde-
sirable and unnecessary result. Specifically, the court in Matos
has sent the following message to criminals in this Common-
wealth: If you spot the police and are in possession of drugs, an
illegal firearm, or anything suspicious - RUN - if you fear that
you might be apprehended, throw down your contraband and
keep running.
As crude as this may sound, this is the unfortunate result of
Commonwealth v. Matos. This comment explores how the deci-
sion in Matos was reached and suggests some ways the results of
the case could have been avoided. Section I of this comment
examines the Matos case. Within this section, the United States
Supreme Court decision in California v. Hodari D.,'2 the case
defining the federal seizure standard, is discussed. The current
movement in the Pennsylvania General Assembly to quell the
Pennsylvania Supreme Court's recent expansion of privacy
rights is reviewed in Section II of this comment. Finally, Section
III discusses possible alternatives to the holding in Matos. Sec-
tion III illustrates that the decision in Matos restrains police to
an unacceptable degree, and hopefully, through legislative initia-
tive, judicial restraint or a change in the make-up of the Penn-
sylvania Supreme Court, the practical results caused by Matos
will change.
9. Id. at 776.
10. Id. at 774.
11. See Commonwealth v. Edmunds, 586 A.2d 887 (Pa. 1991)(holding the Penn-
sylvania Supreme Court free to reject conclusions of the United States Supreme Court as
long as it remains faithful to the minimum guarantees established by the United States
Constitution).
12. 499 U.S. 621 (1991)(holding that a Fourth Amendment "seizure" does not occur
until police officers apply physical force to a citizen or a citizen submits to an officer's
show of authority).
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II. COMMONWEALTH V. MATOS
Commonwealth v. Matos was the consolidation of three
appeals.'" Each case involved situations in which individuals
fled an area in apparent response to the presence of police, dis-
carding incriminating evidence in the process. 14 The court in
Matos faced a single issue: "[W]hether contraband discarded by a
person fleeing a police officer are the fruits of an illegal seizure
where the officer possessed neither probable cause 5 to arrest the
individual nor reasonable suspicion 6 to stop the individual and
perform a Terry Frisk." 7 The court held that the police conduct
in this case, chasing after a fleeing person without reasonable
suspicion, constitutes a seizure under Article I, Section 8 of the
13. Matos, 672 A.2d at 770. The Matos decision consolidated the cases of Common-
wealth v. Carroll, 628 A.2d 398 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1993); Commonwealth v. Matos, 628 A.2d
419 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1993); and Commonwealth v. McFadden, 628 A.2d 420 (Pa. Super. Ct.
1993). Id.
14. Id. In McFadden, two uniformed Philadelphia police officers approached
Andrew McFadden in their marked patrol car. McFadden, 628 A.2d at 420. When
McFadden looked in the direction of the officers, he immediately ran. Id. One of the
officers quickly gave chase. Id. Before the officers apprehended McFadden, he threw a
handgun into some bushes. Id. After recovering the gun, the officers arrested McFadden,
charging him with carrying an unlicensed firearm in public. Id. The trial court sup-
pressed the evidence, but the superior court reversed this decision on appeal. Id.
In Carroll, two uniformed Philadelphia police officers exited their patrol car to
speak with two men standing on a street corner. Carroll, 628 A.2d at 398. While one of
the officers spoke with one of the men, Richard Carroll stood with his hands in his pock-
ets. Id. Upon seeing this, the other officer, with his hand over his gun, asked Carroll to
remove his hands from his pockets. Id. Carroll immediately turned and fled into an
alley, where he slipped and fell to the ground. Id. One of the officers chasing Carroll saw
him fall and observed two packets containing a white substance fall out of Carroll's
pocket. Id. The officer quickly arrested Carroll at gun point. Id. A search of Carroll's
coat pockets revealed an additional forty-five packets containing a white substance. Id.
This evidence was subsequently suppressed by the court of common pleas in a trial
against Carroll, but the superior court reversed this decision. Id.
15. Probable cause is defined as "facts and circumstances within the arresting
officer's knowledge and of which he had reasonably trustworthy information, sufficient in
themselves to warrant a man of reasonable caution to believe an offense has been or is
being committed, and the person to be arrested has committed the offense." Common-
wealth v. Jefferies, 311 A.2d 914, 916 (Pa. 1973)(citing Beck v. Ohio, 379 U.S. 89 (1964)).
16. Reasonable suspicion is defined as the ability of a police officer to "point to
articulated facts which give rise to a reasonable belief criminal activity is afoot." Com-
monwealth v. Hicks, 253 A.2d 276, 280 (Pa. 1969Xinterpreting Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1
(1968), and Sibron v. New York, 392 U.S. 40 (1968)).
17. Matos, 672 A.2d at 771. The phrase "Terry Frisk" refers to the permissible
amount of police intrusion into a persons privacy when an officer has "reasonable suspi-
cion" that an individual may be armed and dangerous. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968).
An officer is permitted to perform a limited search of an individual's outer clothing in an
attempt to discover the presence of weapons that might endanger the safety of the officer
and others. Hicks, 253 A.2d. at 279. The court's phrasing of the issue in Matos overlooks
the subtle difference between the "Terry Stop" and the "Terry Frisk." The former is
meant to be an investigatory tool, while the latter is designed to protect the officers and
others. See Interest of B.C., 683 A.2d 919 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1996).
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Pennsylvania Constitution." Therefore, any incriminating evi-
dence discarded by the fleeing individual during the chase is the
result of an unreasonable seizure and inadmissible in court. 19
In so holding, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court rejected the
holding of the United States Supreme Court in California v.
Hodari D.2°  In that case, a majority of the United States
Supreme Court found that under the Fourth Amendment to the
United States Constitution, a seizure does not occur until police
officers either apply physical force or gain an individual's sub-
mission through their show of authority.2' The facts of Hodari D.
are virtually identical to those in Matos.22 After seeing police
approach in a unmarked cruiser, Hodari fled and discarded con-
traband during the ensuing chase. 23 The Hodari D. Court con-
cluded that, assuming the officer's pursuit was a "show of
authority," there was no seizure because Hodari did not submit.
24
The reasoning of the Hodari D. Court was adopted and
expanded upon by the Superior Court of Pennsylvania in Com-
monwealth v. Carroll, 25 one of the cases later consolidated under
Matos. 2 6 The majority of the superior court in Carroll was satis-
fied that the nature of the encounter between the police and the
citizen in that case was at all times controlled by the citizen.27
Judge Cirillo, writing for the majority, stated "a citizen may
demonstrate his or her objectively reasonable belief that he is
free to leave, by leaving, as did both Hodari D. and, in the case at
hand, Carroll."28 Judge Cirrillo further opined that the citizen
determines whether probable cause or reasonable suspicion
18. Matos, 672 A.2d at 771.
19. Id.
20. Id. See Hodari D., 499 U.S. at 621.
21. Hodari D., 499 U.S. at 626.
22. Compare Hodari D., 499 U.S. at 626, with Matos, 672 A.2d at 771.
23. Hodari D., 499 U.S. at 623. In Hodari D., two officers were patrolling a "high
crime" area in Oakland, California late in the evening when they approached a group of
youths huddled around a car. Id. at 622. The officers were in an unmarked car and
dressed in street clothes. Id. They were, however, wearing jackets with the word "police"
emblazoned on the front and back. Id. Upon seeing the officers, the youths fled in differ-
ent directions and the car exited at a high rate of speed. Id. at 632. The two officers
chased defendant Hodari D. Id. During the chase, Hodari discarded what appeared to be
a small rock. Id. Upon seeing this, one of the officers tackled Hodari and arrested him.
Id. The rock turned out to be crack cocaine. Id. A motion to suppress this evidence was
denied in Hodari's juvenile proceeding, but the California Court of Appeals reversed this
decision. Id.
24. Id. at 629.
25. 628 A.2d 398 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1993).
26. See Carroll, 628 A.2d at 405. The Hodari D. reasoning was also adopted by the
superior court in Commonwealth v. Matos, 628 A.2d 419 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1993), and Com-
monwealth v. McFadden, 628 A.2d 420 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1993).
27. Carroll, 628 A.2d at 405.
28. Id. at 403.
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arises by choosing to discard contraband.29 Flight, absent other
factors, will not justify a "Terry Stop and Frisk."3 ° In other
words, if the individuals in the cases consolidated under Matos
simply continued to run from the police and did not discard con-
traband, reasonable suspicion would never have surfaced. If the
officers subsequently caught the men, the officers could not con-
stitutionally search or even detain them.3 ' Any search or arrest
by the police would clearly have violated these individuals'
Fourth Amendment rights.
3 2
The superior court in Carroll agreed with the United States
Supreme Court's modification of the so called "Mendenhall Test"
in Hodari D.33 Under this test, "a person is seized within the
meaning of the Fourth Amendment only if, in view of all the cir-
cumstances surrounding the incident, a reasonable person would
have believed that he was not free to leave."3 The Hodari D.
Court narrowed the Mendenhall Test when it held that a "show
of authority" only amounts to a seizure if the citizen submits to
the police, i.e., stops running.35 The Court then reasoned that
Hodari's flight from the police demonstrated his ability and will-
ingness to end the encounter.' Similarly, the superior court in
Matos found that Matos demonstrated his "objectively reason-
29. Id.
30. Id. at 404. Justice Cirillo stated: "Carroll always had his own legal protections
in his own hands, and so long as he carefully exercised his right to privacy, that is did not
throw away or drop contraband within the sight of the police, he would not create the
probable cause necessary to justify his arrest." Id. at 403. See In re Barry, 621 A.2d 669
(Pa. Super. Ct. 1993) affd sub nom., Commonwealth v. Biagini, 655 A.2d 492 (Pa. 1995),
for the proposition that flight alone does not create reasonable suspicion.
31. Barry W., 621 A.2d at 678 (holding that an anonymous tip broadcast over a
police radio, coupled with flight on the part of individuals in a generalized area, does not
justify a forcible "Terry Stop").
32. Carroll, 628 A.2d at 405.
33. Id. at 400. The Mendenhall Test comes from the case of United States v. Men-
denhall, 446 U.S. 544 (1980).
34. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. at 554. The United States Supreme Court has in some
instances found ways of avoiding this standard. See Florida v. Bostick, 501 U.S. 429
(1991). In Bostick, the Court stated:
The state court erred, however, in focusing on whether Bostick was "free to leave"
rather than on the principle that those words were intended to capture. When
police attempt to question a person who is walking down the street or through an
airport lobby, it makes sense to inquire whether a reasonable person would feel
free to continue walking. But when the person is seated on a bus and has no desire
to leave, the degree to which a reasonable person would feel that he or she could
leave is not an accurate measure of the coercive effect of the encounter.
Bostick, 501 U.S. at 435-36.
35. Hodari D., 499 U.S. at 629. Since Hodari D., the intermediate federal courts
have adhered to an interpretation of the Mendenhall Test that not only requires a person
to feel restricted from leaving, but also to submit to the police officer's show of authority.
See United States v. Wood, 981 F.2d 536 (App. D.C. Cir. 1992); Tom v. Voida, 963 F.2d
952 (7th Cir. 1992).
36. Hodari D., 499 U.S. at 629.
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able belief that he was free to leave" when he decided to run from
the area. 7
Despite the reasoning set forth by the superior court, the
Pennsylvania Supreme Court in Matos decided to reject the
rationale of Hodari D. and retain the original Mendenhall Test.3"
The court premised its refusal to follow the United States
Supreme Court on the "greater privacy rights" enjoyed by Penn-
sylvanians under Article I, Section 8 of the Pennsylvania
Constitution.
3 9
After briefly discussing Hodari D., the Pennsylvania Supreme
Court supported its departure from the United States Supreme
Court utilizing the analysis set forth in Commonwealth v.
Edmunds.40 Under Edmunds, a Pennsylvania court may use the
following four factors in determining whether to depart from fed-
eral precedent on a matter of constitutional law: 1) the text of
the Pennsylvania constitutional provision in issue and of the cor-
responding federal constitutional provision; 2) the history of the
state constitutional provision, including Pennsylvania case law;
3) the related case law from other states; and 4) policy considera-
tions unique to Pennsylvania.41
In reviewing the text of Article I, Section 8 of the Pennsylvania
Constitution, the Matos court acknowledged that it is almost
identical to its federal counterpart. 42 The court dismissed the
textual similarities, however, by reasoning that it is not bound
"to interpret the two provisions as if they were mirror images of
one another." 43 Justice Cappy, writing for the majority, noted
that the court has "traditionally regarded Article I, Section 8 as
providing different, and broader, protections than its federal
37. Carroll, 628 A.2d at 403.
38. Matos, 672 A.2d at 776.
39. Id. at 770.
40. Id. See Commonwealth v. Edmunds, 586 A.2d 887 (Pa. 1991)(holding there is
no good faith exception to search warrant requirement, thus rejecting United States v.
Leon, 468 U.S. 897 (1984)).
41. Matos, 672 A.2d at 772 (citing Edmunds, 586 A.2d at 895).
42. Id. Article I, Section 8 of the Pennsylvania Constitution provides:
The people shall be secure in their persons, houses, papers and possessions from
unreasonable searches and seizures, and no warrant to search any place or to seize
any person or things shall issue without describing them as nearly as may be, nor
without probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation subscribed to by the
affiant.
PA. CONST. art. I, § 8.
The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution provides:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects,
against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no warrants
shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation, and particu-
larly describing the place to be searched and the persons or things to be seized.
U.S. CoNsT. amend. IV.
43. Matos, 672 A.2d at 772 (citing Edmunds, 586 A.2d at 896).
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counterpart."" In support of this conclusion, the court cited the
origin of the state constitutional provision and the fact that the
provision has remained the same for over two hundred years.46
The above rationale, however, falls short of providing suffi-
cient justification for rejecting the holding of the United States
Supreme Court in Hodari D. Only ten years before the decision
in Matos, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court cited textual similar-
ities between the Fourth Amendment and Article I, Section 8 of
the Pennsylvania Constitution as support for interpreting the
two provisions in a consistent manner."
The Matos court next cited the "history" and "context" of the
state constitutional provision as support for a greater privacy
right in Pennsylvania.4v This reasoning, however, is also flawed.
Both the Fourth Amendment and Article I, Section 8 of the Penn-
sylvania Constitution were created around the same time, and
both sought to eliminate the same evil, general warrants. 4 In
fact, Pennsylvania's search and seizure provision was amended
after the passage of the Fourth Amendment to reduce textual dif-
ferences between the two provisions.49 Furthermore, although
Article I, Section 8 dates back more than two hundred years, fric-
tion between the federal and state high courts, in the context of
enforcing freedom from unreasonable searches and seizures,
appears to be of recent vintage. The Pennsylvania Supreme
Court did not abandon a holding of the United States Supreme
Court concerning search and seizure until 1979.50
To further support the notion that Pennsylvania has a "strong
preference for the rights of the individual in the face of coercive
state action," the court in Matos also cited Pennsylvania case law
including Commonwealth v. Jefferies,51 Commonwealth v.
44. Id.
45. Id. at 772-73. The court noted that Article I, Section 8 was written before pas-
sage of the Fourth Amendment. Id.
46. See Commonwealth v. Gray, 503 A.2d 921, 926 (Pa. 1985).
47. Matos, 672 A.2d at 772.
48. See Commonwealth v. Schaeffer, 536 A.2d 354 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1987)(Kelly, J.,
dissenting) for a cogent analysis of the similarities between the Fourth Amendment and
Article I, Section 8 of the Pennsylvania Constitution.
"General warrant" refers to a warrant issued in England prior to the American
Revolution that allowed for searches of unnamed persons and unnamed premises.
BLAcies LAw DICTIONARY 1585 (6th ed. 1990).
49. See Schaeffer, 536 A.2d at 384 (Kelly, J., dissenting).
50. See Commonwealth v. DeJohn, 403 A.2d 1283 (Pa. 1979)(refusing to follow
United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435 (1976), which held that a person has no standing to
object to the seizure of his or her bank records).
51. 311 A.2d 914 (Pa. 1973)(holding when a police officer chases an individual
without probable cause or reasonable suspicion, there is a seizure in violation of the
Fourth Amendment).
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Jones52 and Commonwealth v. Barnett.53 Specifically, the court
found that Jones, the "precursor" to Mendenhall, was dispositive
of the definition of seizure in Pennsylvania.54 Under Jones, the
standard for determining when a seizure has occurred is
"whether a reasonable person innocent of any crime, would have
thought he was being restrained had he been in the defendant's
shoes."55
The cases cited by the Matos court, however, are factually dis-
tinguishable from Matos and present much clearer examples of
seizure. 56 Furthermore, as the dissent in Matos noted, both Jef
feries and Barnett were decided under the Fourth Amendment.57
As such, they were overruled by the holding in Hodari D., which
held that a police chase does not constitute a Fourth Amendment
seizure.58
The Matos court next examined how other states have dealt
with Hodari D.59 The court concluded that while many states
have adhered to the Hodari D. holding, these states did so
because they do not have a history of providing greater privacy
rights under their respective state constitutions.6 0 Those juris-
dictions declining to follow Hodari D., the court noted, refuse to
abandon the Mendenhall "free to leave test" because they have a
history of providing greater privacy rights under their own con-
stitutions.6 ' The Matos court then likened Pennsylvania to these
states by reiterating its "emphatic" recognition of a stronger
right of privacy enjoyed by the citizens of this Commonwealth.6 2
52. 378 A.2d 835 (Pa. 1977)(holding that a "Terry Stop" is initiated "when a reason-
able person innocent of any crime, would have thought he was being restrained had he
been in the defendant's shoes").
53. Matos, 672 A.2d at 774. See Commonwealth v. Barnett, 398 A.2d 1019 (Pa.
1979)(following the holding announced in Jefferies, 311 A.2d at 914).
54. Matos, 672 A.2d at 774.,
55. Jones, 378 A.2d at 840.
56. See Commonwealth v. Lewis, 636 A.2d 619 (Pa. 1994)(finding that the defend-
ants were seized when officers continued to approach them until their backs were up
against wall); Commonwealth v. Lovett, 450 A.2d 975 (Pa. 1982)(finding the defendant
seized when the defendant and companions were placed in a police cruiser without con-
sent for the purpose of transport to the crime scene).
57. Matos, 672 A.2d at 777 n.1 (Castille, J., dissenting).
58. Id.
59. Id. at 775.
60. Id. (citing State v. Aqundis, 903 P.2d 752 (Idaho 1995); Johnson v. State, 864
S.W.2d 708 (Tex. App. 1993); State v. Cronin, 509 N.W.2d 673 (Neb. App. 1993); Hender-
son v. Maryland, 579 A.2d 486 (Md. App. 1991)).
61. Id. (citing State v. Tucker, 642 A.2d 401 (N.J. 1994); In re E.D.J., 502 N.W.2d
779 (Minn. 1993); New York v. Madera, 624 N.E.2d 675 (N.Y. 1993); State v. Oquendo,
613 A.2d 1300 (Conn. 1992); State v. Quino, 840 P.2d 358 (Haw. 1992); State v. Holmes,
813 P.2d 28 (Or. 1991)).
62. Matos, 672 A.2d at 775.
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While examining the holdings of sister states may be instruc-
tive, these cases obviously have no precedential value. Further-
more, if any other court is looked upon for guidance, our courts
should look first to the highest court in the land. Of course, for
the current supreme court, decisions that come from the United
States Supreme Court are given no deference at all.
63
In a final attempt to justify its rejection of Hodari D., the
Matos court proceeded to the fourth prong of the Edmunds anal-
ysis and discussed public policy considerations.q Initially, the
court noted that Pennsylvanians are under no duty to stop or
respond to an officer's inquiry and are free to leave an inquiry at
any time. 5 The court then held that adopting the position taken
in Hodari D. would require a "narrowing" of the definition of
seizure that is "contrary to the protections afforded by Article I,
Section 8 of the Pennsylvania Constitution. " '
The court's reasoning as to the public policy matter, however,
should not form the basis for refusing to follow Hodari D. As
Justice Cavanaugh noted in his concurrence to Carroll, "while
we can interpret our own constitution to afford defendants
greater protections than the federal constitution does ... there
should be a compelling reason to do so."
67
If the court could provide compelling reasons for breaking from
federal precedent, it could better justify any lack of uniformity
between prosecutions in federal court and those in state court.
The Matos court, however, does not provide any reasons, let
alone compelling reasons, for departing from Hodari D.
Ten years prior to Matos, a majority of the state supreme court
seemed to be receptive to the need for compelling reasons to
63. See Commonwealth v. Edmunds, 586 A.2d 887 (Pa. 1991)(rejecting United
States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897 (1984), which held that there is a "good faith exception to
constitutionally invalid search warrants"); Commonwealth v. Chambers, 598 A.2d 539
(Pa. 1991) (applying a stricter interpretation of the "knock and announce" rule than that
required under federal precedent); Commonwealth v. Rodriguez, 614 A.2d 1378 (Pa.
1992) (implicitly rejecting Michigan v. Summers, 452 U.S. 692 (1981), which held that a
temporary seizure of occupants of a house lawfully searched was reasonable); Common-
wealth v. Johnston, 530 A.2d 74 (Pa. 1987) (holding probable cause required before a
canine sniff of a person, rejecting United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696 (1983), which held
that a canine sniff is not a "search" under the United States Constitution); Common-
wealth v. White, 669 A.2d 896 (Pa. 1995) (rejecting New York v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454
(1981), which established the "automobile exception" to search warrants).
64. Matos, 672 A.2d at 775.
65. Id. (citing Commonwealth v. Douglass, 539 A.2d 412 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1988),
alloc, den., 552 A.2d 250 (Pa. 1988)).
66. Id. at 776.
67. Carroll, 628 A.2d at 405 (Cavanaugh, J., concurring)(citing Commonwealth v.
Gray, 503 A.2d 921 (Pa. 1985)). Justice Cavanaugh stated: "To rule without compelling
reason that the two Constitutions differ erodes public confidence in the Rule of the Law."
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depart from the United States Supreme Court as to what consti-
tutes an unreasonable search or seizure.' Despite inclinations
toward a "compelling reason" standard by the superior court,69
however, apparently the current supreme court does not agree
with the standard. In Matos, the court fails to give any compel-
ling reasons for a broad definition of seizure, such as evidence of
police abusing their power by routinely harassing innocent citi-
zens in Pennsylvania. The supreme court fails to provide us with
any compelling evidence that would necessitate rejection of the
United States Supreme Court's holding in Hodari D. As Justice
Castille noted, the majority seemed to fear that following Hodari
D. would place this state on a "slippery slope," leading eventually
to a police state. 70 Such a fear, however, is not justified, consider-
ing the lack of such "police states" in those jurisdictions that
have adopted the holding of Hodari D.
Although individuals certainly have a right to avoid
encounters with police who possess no justification to detain
them, the police fail in their duties if they do not chase individu-
als who flee from them and attempt to ascertain why the individ-
uals decided to flee. Police officers are not simply hired to
investigate a crime after it has occurred; they are hired to
attempt to prevent crime.7' Of course, the fact that one flees
from a police officer's sight, without more, may not be enough to
justify the police officer forcibly halting his or her flight.72 It
should, however, suffice to justify the police officer's attempt to
maintain observation of the person's actions while in public.
While there may be an innocent reason for a person's flight, the
police should not shrug their shoulders and assume that every
person who runs is innocent. Such a policy is offensive to our
68. See Gray, 503 A.2d at 926 (adopting "totality of circumstances" approach pos-
ited by the United States Supreme Court in Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213 (1983)). In
Gray, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court stated:
While we can interpret our own constitution to afford defendants greater protec-
tions than the federal constitution does, there should be a compelling reason to do
so. . . . Besides, there is no substantial textual difference between the Fourth
Amendment to the United States Constitution and Article I, Section 8 of the Penn-
sylvania Constitution that would require us to expand the protections afforded
under the federal document.
Gray, 503 A.2d at 926.
69. See Interest of B.C., 683 A.2d 919, 927 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1996)(holding that "plain
feel" doctrine pronounced in Minnesota v. Dickerson, 508 U.S. 366 (1993) was acceptable
under Pennsylvania Constitution).
70. Matos, 672 A.2d at 776 (Castille, J., dissenting).
71. Id. Justice Castille stated: "[P]art of a police officer's duty is to investigate
crime before it occurs, not simply stand by idly and wait for an offense to be committed
before taking action." Id.
72. Interest of Barry, 621 A.2d 669 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1993) (holding ffight from police
presence, absent other factors, does not justify reasonable suspicion).
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common sense. Furthermore, the occasional innocent person
who flees at the mere sight of a police cruiser is still protected.
As the majority of the superior court noted in Carroll, as long as
the individual never discards contraband, reasonable suspicion
will not surface. 7' Any search of that person, based solely on his
or her flight, would be unreasonable, and the fruits of the search
would be suppressed.74
Under the holding in Matos, the police are forced to sit back
and watch while individuals flee from their presence. If the
police are lucky, the fleeing individuals will discard something
within the officer's sight. If not, the police must let possibly dan-
gerous criminals, who otherwise might be apprehended, freely
roam the streets.
Clearly, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court can expand the
rights of state citizens beyond those protected by the federal
courts.7 5 The question remains, however, should the court
expand those rights? Implicit in this question is the balancing of
two very important interests: (1) the citizen's right to be free
from unwarranted intrusion by the police; versus (2) the inter-
ests of the citizen to be free from individuals who "roam the
streets, destroy the neighborhood and threaten the fabric of our
lives and the public safety with contraband and weapons on pub-
lic streets and byways."76
While the supreme court in Matos may have refused to con-
sider the seriousness of the crime in question in that case, the
considerable damage that the drug trade has caused this Com-
monwealth is difficult to ignore.7 When balancing the interests
of individual rights and the good of the community, perhaps the
court should consider the damage caused by the drug trade. If
the court had articulated concrete reasons, even if not compel-
ling, for departing from Hodari D., citizens might better under-
stand the need for greater protection from intrusive police
conduct in Pennsylvania. Instead, we are left asking why Penn-
sylvania is different.
73. Carroll, 628 A.2d at 404.
74. Barry, 621 A.2d at 680.
75. See Edmunds, 586 A.2d at 894-95.
76. Matos, 672 A.2d at 776 (Castille, J., dissenting).
77. The court in Matos stated:
The seriousness of criminal activity under investigation, whether it is the sale of
drugs or the commission of a violent crime, can never be used as justification for
ignoring or abandoning the constitutional right of every individual in this Com-
monwealth to be free from intrusions upon his or her personal liberty absent prob-
able cause
Matos, 672 A.2d at 776 (citing Commonwealth v. Rodriquez, 614 A.2d 1378, 1383 (Pa.
1992)).
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The court in Matos hangs its hat for distinguishing Penn-
sylvania from those states that follow Hodari D. on the "history
and tradition" of Article I, Section 8.78 While history and tradi-
tion are certainly important, of equal importance is the ever
increasing problem of street crime. Without providing a suffi-
cient explanation for its decision in Matos, the court remains
more open than ever to claims of being overly sympathetic to
criminals in this state.79
While it is very unlikely that the Pennsylvania Supreme Court
is purposefully attempting to aid criminals from escaping prose-
cution, the court's decision to retain the Mendenhall Test has
improved a criminal's chance of suppressing incriminating evi-
dence. Furthermore, the "free to leave" standard of Mendenhall
makes it difficult for a police officer to determine at what point in
time his or her approach of an individual becomes a pursuit.8 0
This difficulty can be seen by applying the Mendenhall Test to a
case such as Matos. In that case, the police officers' actions of
patrolling the street in a police cruiser near Matos cannot rea-
sonably be said to constitute a seizure. Thus, at what point did
the Matos incident escalate into a full blown seizure? Was it the
moment the officer got out of his cruiser, or the moment he fol-
lowed Matos? Maybe it was the moment the officers began to
catch up to Matos. The point is that the court's analysis under
Mendenhall does not provide us with a clear answer. The prob-
lem with the Mendenhall Test, therefore, is that it requires
police officers to know how their actions will be perceived and it
does not give them clear rules on how to do their job. The better
approach is to follow the test posited by the United States
Supreme Court in Hodari D., under which a seizure is defined as
the time when a citizen submits to a show of authority.8' The
Hodari D. test of physical force or submission to a show of
authority provides a clear line, since the nature of a police/citizen
encounter is measured under this test at the time of approach.
This bright line test is preferable to Mendenhall because it
allows police officers to rely on their proper intentions when
encountering citizens, and to react appropriately as uncertain
78. See supra notes 41-44 and accompanying text for a discussion of the Matos
court's reliance on history and tradition.
79. See infra notes 87 and 91 and accompanying text for remarks made by the
current court's opponents.
80. Carroll, 628 A.2d at 405. The court in Carroll reasoned that the Mendenhall
Test, also called "coerced abandonment," leaves both the citizen and officer without clear
guidance as to when a seizure occurs. Id. The court asks: "what is coercion? Following in
the car? Chasing at a walk? Chasing at a run? Chasing with a hand on a holstered gun?"
Id.
81. Hodari D., 499 U.S. at 626.
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events unfold without the need to simultaneously assess the sub-
jective mindset of the individual they attempt to observe and
investigate.
III. LEGISLATIVE RESPONSE TO THE PENNSYLVANIA SUPREME
COURTS EXPANSivE INTERPRETATION OF ARTICLE 1, SECTION 8
OF THE PENNSYLVANIA CONSTYTuTION
While the Matos decision may mark the end of the analysis for
the current supreme court on the issue of what constitutes a
seizure, there is movement in the Pennsylvania Legislature that
could profoundly effect Matos as well as several other decisions
concerning search and seizure law in Pennsylvania. 2 Senate
Bill 806, introduced in March of 1995, would require all Penn-
sylvania courts, via amendment to the Pennsylvania Constitu-
tion, to follow the mandates of the United States Supreme Court
on matters involving search and seizure.' Although such a prop-
osition is an affront to the ideals of federalism and state auton-
omy to many people," similar amendments to Senate Bill 806
have passed in California and Florida. 8 If Senate Bill 806
becomes law, it would necessarily overturn Matos and require
the Pennsylvania Supreme Court to adhere to Hodari D. 16
Senate Bill 806 was prompted by a string of decisions by the
Pennsylvania Supreme Court in which the court rejected United
States Supreme Court precedent by holding that there is an
increased right to privacy in Pennsylvania as compared to that
enjoyed by citizens under federal law. v Justice Castille has
82. See S. 806, 179th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Pa. 1995).
83. Id. Specifically, Senate Bill 806 would add the following to the text of Article 1,
Section 8 of the Pennsylvania Constitution:
[Tihe rights and procedural restrictions mandated by this section shall be identical
to those mandated by the Fourth Amendment to the Constitution of the United
States, as interpreted by the United States Supreme Court. The rights and proce-
dural restrictions respecting searches and seizures shall not be judicially expanded
by decisional law or court rule to exceed the rights and procedural restrictions
mandated by this section.
Id.
84. Justice Brandeis is noted as supporting the proposition that states should
serve as laboratories to try novel social and economic experiments without risk to the rest
of the country. See, e.g., New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S 262 (1932)(Brandeis, J.,
dissenting). While Justice Brandeis indeed favored the states acting as laboratories, he
did not advocate the state courts as precipitating such experiments, but rather advocated
that it should be the citizens' choice. Id.
85. See CAL. CONST. art. 1, § 28(d); FLA. CONST. art. 1, § 12.
86. The Senate Appropriations Committee is currently considering Senate Bill 806.
87. The cases often cited as the impetus for Senate Bill 806 are: Commonwealth v.
Edmunds, 586 A.2d 887 (Pa. 1991)(rejecting United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897 (1984),
which held that there is a "good faith" exception to constitutionally invalid search war-
rants); Commonwealth v. Chambers, 598 A.2d 539 (Pa. 1991) (applying stricter interpre-
tation of "knock and announce" rule than required under federal precedent);
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described the recent court's decisions as shielding criminal
defendants from responsibility for their crimes.8 8  Common-
wealth v. Matos, 8 9 decided almost one year after the introduction
of Senate Bill 806, has only provided ammunition for those who
support the bill.90
Many of those who support the passage of Senate Bill 806 have
directly criticized the supreme court for supporting the criminal
element in our state.9' While it is difficult, if not impossible, to
imagine that our supreme court has the intent of aiding
criminals in Pennsylvania, the frustration of those who oppose
the court's recent decisions is understandable. The court's
refusal to follow the holding in Hodari D. has led to the suppres-
sion of more evidence in criminal trials, which, in turn, results in
less convictions. 92
As with any proposed constitutional amendment, the likeli-
hood that Senate Bill 806 will pass is very much uncertain. Pas-
sage of the amendment depends a great deal upon whether the
proponents or opponents of the bill persuade the voters through
their respective lobbying efforts. If the amendment does pass the
Commonwealth v. Rodriguez, 614 A.2d 1378 (Pa. 1992) (implicitly rejecting Michigan v.
Summers, 452 U.S. 692 (1981), which held that temporary seizure of occupants of a house
lawfully searched was reasonable); Commonwealth v. Johnston, 530 A.2d 74 (Pa. 1987)
(holding probable cause required before canine sniffs person, rejecting United States v.
Place, 462 U.S. 696 (1983), which held that canine sniff is not a "search" under United
States Constitution); Commonwealth v. White, 669 A.2d 896 (Pa. 1995) (rejecting New
York v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454 (1981), which established "automobile exception" to search
warrants)). Representative Al Masland of Carlise, Pennsylvania stated: "Senate bill 806
was the only response possible to reign [sic] in the Pennsylvania Supreme Court which
has, through a continued course of conduct, demonstrated its disdain for law enforcement
and its support for drug trafficking defendants." Letter from Al Masland, Pennsylvania
Representative, to Interested Constituents (July 3, 1996).
88. See Commonwealth v. Roebuck, 681 A.2d 1279, 1288 (Pa. 1996)(Castille, J.,
dissenting). The majority in Roebuck held that in the absence of countervailing consider-
ations produced by the Commonwealth, the Commonwealth must disclose the identity of
a confidential informant to a criminal defendant. Id. at 1284-85. Justice Castille opined
that such a rule will lead to a dramatic decrease in the number of informants due to their
fear of retaliation. Id. at 1287 (Castille, J., dissenting).
89. 672 A.2d 769 (Pa. 1996).
90. Matos is cited throughout inter-office memoranda and letters written to con-
stituents by those who support the passage of Senate Bill 806.
91. See supra note 87 and accompanying text for a discussion of one legislator's
response to constituents. Philadelphia District Attorney Lynne Abraham stated: "The
Pennsylvania Supreme Court has embarked on a campaign to give criminals new,
expanded rights to suppress the evidence of their activity, and to tie the hands of police
attempting to investigate and control crime in our neighborhoods." Letter from Lynne
Abraham, Philadelphia District Attorney, to Hon. Thomas P. Gannon, Chairman Penn-
sylvania House Judiciary Committee (June 4, 1996).
92. Interview with Anthony Himes, Assistant District Attorney of Erie County, in
Erie, Pennsylvania (Sept. 14, 1996). Mr. Himes stated that within his office, four cases
were dropped because evidence was inadmissible under Matos. Id.
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General Assembly, however, it may also be passed by the voters,
particularly if they see the bill as an anti-crime measure.
IV. ALTERNATIVES TO A CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT
The idea of forcing a state's highest court to follow the rulings
of the United States Supreme Court can reasonably be viewed as
offensive to the notion of federalism and state autonomy.93 After
all, states are free to expand the minimum guarantees provided
under the federal Constitution if they base such decisions on
"adequate and independent state grounds."94 Furthermore, if the
federal minimums drop, a constitutional amendment that forces
the state to follow federal mandates would leave our courts with
no remedy even if the federal minimums are truly offensive to
Pennsylvanians.
If Senate Bill 806 is not enacted, is the Matos decision the last
word on what constitutes a seizure by the Pennsylvania Supreme
Court? Although it is unlikely that the supreme court will
reverse the Matos decision, there are alternative theories under
which the court can ponder the issue of when a police officer's
show of authority becomes a seizure of an individual.
A. Reasonable Suspicion - The Importance of Flight from
Police Presence
As people become aware of the holding in Commonwealth v.
Matos, their first reaction may be to ask: "[I]sn't the mere fact
that a person runs from the police enough for the police to form a
reasonable suspicion?" To these people, common sense dictates
that if an individual runs from the police, he or she must be
guilty of something. The harsh realities of our urban centers,
however, paints a much different reality.9 5 As Justice Stevens
noted in his dissent to Hodari D., the notion that flight alone
may be enough for reasonable suspicion ignores the experience of
many citizens, particularly minorities, in our society.9"
93. The court in Edmunds observed: "[Tihe United States Supreme Court has
repeatedly affirmed that states are not only free to go, but also encouraged to engage in
independent analysis in drawing meaning from their own state constitutions." Edmunds,
586 A.2d at 893.
94. Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032 (1983).
95. See generally David Harris, Factors for Reasonable Suspicion: When Black and
Poor Means Stopped and Frisked, 69 IND. L. J. 659 (1994), for a cogent analysis of inno-
cent reasons for ffight.
96. Hodari D., 499 U.S. at 630 n.4 (Stevens, J., dissentingXcitations omitted). Jus-
tice Stevens stated: "ITihe Court's gratuitous quotation from Proverbs 28:1, mistakenly
assumes that innocent residents have no reason to fear the sudden approach of strangers.
We have previously reconsidered, and rejected, this ivory towered analysis of the real
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While flight alone may not be enough to raise a reasonable
suspicion, should it not be an important factor for an officer on
the street to consider when he or she is making the split second
decision of whether or not to chase a fleeing individual? The Cal-
ifornia Supreme Court is at least one. court that has responded to
this question in the affirmative. In People v. Souza,9" the court
held that despite a possibly innocent excuse for fleeing the police,
flight "is a proper consideration - and indeed can be a key factor-
in determining whether in a particular case the police have suffi-
cient cause to detain."9" Without denying that a person has a
right to avoid police contact, the court considered the manner in
which that person chooses to avoid contact a proper considera-
tion for an officer. 9
The Souza court chose to adopt a "totality of the circum-
stances" approach in determining whether reasonable suspicion
exists in a possibly criminal situation.100 Among the circum-
stances to be considered are the area's reputation for crime, the
time of day and the evasive conduct of those whom the officer
approaches. 1°1 This holding allows police the ability to use their
unique training, experience and insight in making a determina-
tion of reasonable suspicion. 0 2 Furthermore, the court insisted
that the "reasonable suspicion" determination, when made after
the fact, should be viewed from the eyes of the law enforcement
officer at the scene rather than legal scholars.10 3
world for it fails to describe the experience of many residents, particularly if they are
members of a minority." Id.
97. 885 P.2d 982 (Cal. 1994).
98. Souza, 885 P.2d at 988.
99. Id. The court stated:
[Tihere is an appreciable difference between declining to answer a police officer's
questions during a street encounter and fleeing at the first sight of a uniformed
police officer. Because the latter shows not only unwillingness to partake in ques-
tioning but also unwillingness to be observed and possibly identified, it is a much
stronger indicator of... guilt.
Id.
100. Id. at 992.
101. Id. David Harris criticizes these factors in his article concerning minority sta-
tus and its relationship to stop and frisks. See note 95 and accompanying text.
102. Id. The court in Souza states:
Consequently, we must allow those we hire to maintain our peace as well as to
apprehend criminals after the fact, to give appropriate consideration to their sur-
roundings and to draw rational inferences therefrom, unless we are prepared to
insist that they cease to exercise their senses and their reasoning abilities the
moment they venture forth on patrol.
Id. (citing People v. Holloway, 221 Cal. Rptr. 394 (Cal. App. 1985)).
103. Souza, 885 P.2d at 992. The court stated that justification for a seizure "must
be seen and weighed not in terms of library analysis by scholars, but as understood by
those versed in the field of law enforcement." Id. (quoting United States v. Cortez, 449
U.S. 411 (1981)).
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If the Pennsylvania Supreme Court adopted the same reason-
ing as the California Supreme Court as to reasonable suspicion,
the decision in Matos may have been different. Whether the
issue of reasonable suspicion was ever litigated in the Matos
case, however, is unclear. Utilizing the Souza analysis, one can
argue that the particular facts of Matos gave rise to reasonable
suspicion. After all, two officers were on patrol when they
received a radio call that unknown persons were selling narcotics
at a particular location. 10 4 When the officers arrived at that loca-
tion, they observed three men standing on a corner, who scat-
tered at the first sight of the officers. 10 5 These three men did not
just walk from the officers, but ran.10 6 When viewed from the
perspective of a police officer, these factors arguably give rise to
reasonable suspicion. If the officers did not chase the individu-
als, many would have argued that they were failing in their
duties.
Deference to the judgment of police officers who are exper-
ienced in the war on narcotics when assessing whether or not
reasonable suspicion exists would maximize their efforts. The
Pennsylvania Supreme Court, however, has rejected such an
"ends justify the means analysis" by declining the opportunity to
adopt a more expansive approach to reasonable suspicion in drug
investigations. 10 7 While this author does not seek to abandon the
constitutional protections afforded to the citizens of this state,
the Souza court's rationale is more in tune with the balance of
interests at stake; that is, the right to be free from unreasonable
seizures versus the right to be free from the infestation of illegal
drugs. The result reached under Matos unfortunately leaves the
criminal with the easy way out. All the criminal has to do to
evade a successful prosecution is run and discard incriminating
evidence during flight from a police officer in order to be home
free.
See also Commonwealth v. DeWitt, 608 A.2d 1030 (Pa. 1992)(McDermott, J., dissenting).
Justice McDermott stated:
These are facts [referring to the facts of the case] which only ingenious gamesman-
ship can dismiss as insufficient for an investigative stop. The Majority, cool, specu-
lative, safely distant, can always be wiser, more indulgent in their quiet
lucubrations. Their adrenaline is controlled, their hearts ticking away on a soft
afternoon. However, police officers who are patrolling the front lines of the battle-
field of crime must contend with the realities of their environment, and must be
free to read and react to those signs which their experience tells them portends
felonious activity.
Id. at 1035.
104. Matos, 672 A.2d at 770-71.
105. Id.
106. Id.
107. See generally Commonwealth v. Rodriquez, 614 A.2d 1378 (Pa. 1992).
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B. An Exception to the Exclusionary Rule
A second option to Matos available to the current supreme
court is to create an exception to the Exclusionary Rule that
allows evidence discarded by an individual fleeing a police officer
to be admitted in court. 0 8 Professor Michelle Ghetti, a propo-
nent of such an exception, has noted that there is a real problem
in the war on drugs with so called "throw down" cases; that is,
cases where the person charged with possession of illegal drugs
successfully has the drug evidence suppressed since he or she
discarded the evidence while fleeing the police. Without the
damaging drug evidence, successful prosecution is unlikely. 109
Instead of narrowing the definition of seizure and thus affect-
ing individuals innocent of any crime, the Pennsylvania Supreme
Court could create a simple exception to the exclusionary rule
providing that evidence abandoned during a police chase is not to
be excluded from admission at trial. As Professor Ghetti states,
such a rule would eliminate the shielding of criminals who dis-
card contraband during a police chase and also protect citizens
searched by the police without reasonable suspicion. 110
Such an exception to the exclusionary rule would both satisfy
the debate over Matos and also the goals sought under Senate
Bill 806. The exception would also allow prosecutors to bring to
justice those who have previously avoided the ramifications of
disarming contraband. Additionally, by retaining the Menden-
hall "free to leave test," those who do not discard contraband
during a police chase will be protected by the Exclusionary Rule
since any prosecution would not benefit from the illegally seized
evidence.
V. CONCLUSION
While it is difficult to imagine that the Pennsylvania Supreme
Court will redefine what constitutes a seizure, it may be forced,
in the near future, to accept the mandates of the United States
Supreme Court as to this issue. Instead of passing an amend-
ment that ties the hands of the Pennsylvania Supreme Court
this way, however, perhaps those who oppose the current court
should seek redress for Matos by exercising their ability to vote
the incumbent members of the court out of office. Although per-
108. The Exclusionary Rule excludes evidence seized in violation of an individual's
Fourth Amendment rights, and was adopted by the United States Supreme Court in
Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383 (1914), and Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
109. See Michelle Ghetti, Seizure through the Looking Glass: Constitutional analy-
sis in Alice's Wonderland, 22 S. U. L. REv. 231 (1995).
110. Id. at 252-53.
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suading the electorate to do this would be difficult to say the
least, it is a much more reasonable solution to the confining
effects of the proposed constitutional amendment.
Under the current state of the law, Pennsylvanians are left
with the following possibilities. If a person is approached by FBI
agents and takes flight with the agents in pursuit, any contra-
band discarded by the person during flight can be used against
them during their criminal prosecution in federal court.11' Con-
versely, if the same person is pursued by Pennsylvania state
troopers, any evidence he or she discards will be suppressed as
the fruit of an illegal seizure." 2
While the former situation provides officers with clear gui-
dance in their daily activities, the latter rewards criminals for
running from the police. If criminals think they might get
caught during a police chase, all they have to do is discard their
contraband, or worse, a loaded weapon. If the criminals believe
they can evade the officers, they can keep their drugs and guns
for another day.
As Justice Castille pointed out in dissent in Matos, "that a per-
son voluntarily chooses to flee from the mere presence of a police
officer should not immunize that person when he abandons con-
traband, weapons, or any other evidence during the course of his
flight and a police officer's pursuit."" 3 Unfortunately, without
giving us concrete reasons for doing so, this is precisely what a
majority of the Pennsylvania Supreme Court in Matos has
allowed to happen.
Michael A. Agresti
111. Hodari D., 499 U.S. at 629. Id.
112. Matos, 672 A.2d at 770. Assuming the police do not have reasonable suspicion,
any evidence discarded is the direct result of the troopers coercive conduct, i.e., giving
chase. Id.
113. Id. at 781 (Castille, J., dissenting).

